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ABSTRACT
The article explores party-based populist and radical right looking at
the cases of Latvia’s National Alliance (NA) and of the Estonian
Conservative People’s Party (EKRE). The research question is: How
does the intersection between the specificities of party-systems
and particularistic identity-politics either facilitate or complicate
the political engagements of EKRE and NA? This piece
demonstrates that whereas the Latvian party-system provides the
opportunity structure for the inclusion of NA as a legitimate
partner into the government coalition, Estonia’s mainstream
political parties keep on excluding EKRE from the halls of power.
This occurrence is highly subject to the different ways that the
two-party systems have been dealing with parties suspected of
pro-Kremlin leanings (Estonia: Eesti Keskerakond/Centre Party;
Latvia: Saskaņa/Harmony). Meanwhile, the socio-psychological
campaigns of both EKRE and NA over immigration and the
refugee crisis tend to interlink these two policy-areas with
the collective memories of ‘colonization’ under the Soviets and
the collective anxieties of becoming ‘colonized’ again by others.
This socio-psychological strategy has enabled both parties to
augment their public appeal.
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1. Introduction
The populist and radical right in Central and Eastern Europe has been attracting the inter-
est of academic experts (Minkenberg, 2015, 2017; Pirro, 2013; Pytlas, 2015; van Kessel,
2015). However, the academic literature on this party-family in the Baltic States remains
limited (Auers & Kasekamp, 2009, 2013, 2015) and needs to be enhanced. This necessity
becomes more urgent taking into consideration that the Baltic States are the three
most successfully consolidated democracies inside the post-Soviet space (Meleshevich,
2007). One additional factor that raises the necessity for more extensive treatises of the
populist and radical right in the Baltic States is the increasing impact of new catalysts in
these societies: immigration and the controversies over the refugee distribution debate.1
Of high importance is to examine how populist and radical right-wing parties adapt to
specific national settings and how the political circumstances can provide trajectories
towards either the inclusion or the exclusion of populist and radical right-wing parties
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in certain countries and during certain periods. Another very timely objective is to set in
context how populist and radical right-wing parties can selectively appropriate particular-
istic identity and memory politics from the pre-existing political cultures in specific
countries and embed them into their narratives on up-to-date and hot-button issues
(e.g. immigration). This article hints that the more systematic cooperation between aca-
demic experts in nationalism and academic experts in right-wing populism would
enable the latter to formulate new interpretative models about how (right-wing) populist
and Eurosceptic actors embed their agendas inside the pre-existing political cultures of
nationalism and particularistic identity and memory politics. The systemization of this
interdisciplinary cooperation can be beneficial to the study of right-wing populism not
solely in the Baltic States or the Visegrad Four, but also in Western Europe.
This piece demonstrates that whereas the Latvian party-system provides the opportu-
nity structure for the inclusion of the National Alliance (NA) as a legitimate partner into the
government coalition, Estonia’s mainstream political parties keep on excluding the Esto-
nian Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) from the halls of power. This occurrence is
highly subject to the different ways that the two-party systems have been dealing with
parties suspected of pro-Kremlin leanings (Estonia: Eesti Keskerakond/Centre Party;
Latvia: Saskaņa/Harmony). Meanwhile, the socio-psychological campaigns of both EKRE
and NA over immigration and the refugee crisis tend to interlink these two policy-areas
with the collective memories of ‘colonization’ under the Soviets and the collective
anxieties of becoming ‘colonized’ again by others. This socio-psychological strategy has
enabled both parties to augment their public appeal. The research question here is:
How does the intersection between the specificities of party-systems and particularistic
identity-politics either facilitate or complicate the political engagements of EKRE and NA?
This is a paired comparison (Tarrow, 2010) which has relied on a qualitative and dis-
course analysis of EKRE’s and NA’s political programmes and other party documents
(e.g. electoral manifestos) as well as official statements and declarations. To these
should be added semi-structured interviews with top affiliates of EKRE and NA, as well
as locally-based academic researchers with an expertise in Populism, Nationalism and
Estonian/Latvian party-politics (conducted between 2016 and 2018). Quantitative
sources such as public surveys have been of complementary importance. In light of the
limited academic literature on the populist and radical right in the Baltic States, this
piece has also relied on relevant articles from the Estonian, Latvian and international
press. This material has been analyzed through the lens of the relevant academic literature.
The selection of the two cases conforms to the most similar system design (MSSD)
approach. Following this logic, the features of the parties studied in this piece appear
overall highly comparable and display a high degree of similarity2; however, their devel-
opmental trajectories diverge greatly when it comes to these parties’ capacity to
acquire the necessary political centrality in the domestic party system and gain access
to the government coalition. The study focuses on the cases of Estonia and Latvia. The
context of Lithuania – given the conceptual foundations of this study – appears hardly
comparable, considering Lithuania’s different ethno-political context and party system.
In this respect, Mudde (2007) maintains that ‘it is incorrect to speak of a “Baltic model,”
as Lithuania, the third Baltic state, did not follow the ethnocratic model.’3
In the beginning, this piece introduces the theoretical and scholarly literature on the
populist and radical right in Latvia and Estonia. Of particular importance is to isolate the
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fundamental principles of the Bauska Declaration which was signed jointly by the two
parties and their Lithuanian partners in 2013. Throughout the article, this summary will
help assess how the identitarian agenda of the Bauska Declaration still shapes the political
engagements of EKRE and NA. Then, the focus is cast on the operation of the two parties
within their respective national contexts from a comparative angle with a stress on the
enabling and the disabling conditions of the Latvian and Estonian party-systems. The
final section clarifies why and how the two parties have, since 2015, been interlinking
the debate over immigration and the refugee crisis with Estonian and Latvian particular-
istic identity and memory politics.
2. The populist and radical right in Estonia and Latvia: the state of the art
The scholarly literature on the populist and radical right in the Baltic States is particularly
limited (Auers & Kasekamp, 2015; Kasekamp, 1999). The relevant literature – in the Esto-
nian and Latvian contexts – has rarely specialized and was often relegated to a chapter
of the broader research on party politics in post-Communist Europe (Hanley, 2004; Mele-
shevich, 2007). One of the key-goals of this study is to contribute towards filling the scho-
larly gap and reducing its intrinsic parochialism.
The scarcity of scholarly research in the field is acknowledged by the only compara-
tive study by Auers and Kasekamp (2015) where the authors reaffirm the need for
empirical analysis on ‘the extent to which the radical right has impacted the party
system, the political agenda, and ultimately the post-1991 transformation’. In the
authors’ own words, the need is justified as ‘the Baltic States make for interesting com-
parative case studies of the impact and influence of successful radical right political
parties and movements on the political system’. Even the seminal contribution The Far
Right in Europe: An Encyclopedia by Jackson and Davies (2008) seems to neglect the
Baltic context and relegate it to a mere section of the broader debate in Central and
East Europe.
As suggested by Auers and Kasekamp (2015), as well as Lieven (1994), the Estonian and
Latvian cases display a high degree of comparability, both in partisan and broader political
terms. Both countries regained their independence following the collapse of the Soviet
Union and convincingly engaged in successful radical reforms that made them frontrun-
ners in the path towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration. In both political contexts,
the acceptance of the narrative of ‘return to Europe’ has delimited the mainstream political
spectrum, while the ethnic divide and the presence of a substantial ethnic Russian min-
orities, with their partisan representation, has delimited the prospects for coalitions
inside the partisan space. Inside this context, the two main parties of the far right have
faced different fortunes.
The relevance of the ethnic divide became – following the restoration of the state inde-
pendence – a key factor of identity building in both Estonia and Latvia. According to
Mudde (2007, p. 53)
both newly independent states started their process of state- and nation-building confronted
with a huge Russian-speaking population within their borders and a hostile Russian state just
beyond them. Particularly in the early 1990s this led to polarization between a self-conscious,
nativist Estonian/Latvian parties block, on the one hand, and a marginalized and nostalgic Rus-
sophone parties block, on the other.
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This attitude was widely shared in the 1990s by all the key mainstream forces in the two
countries. ‘The nativist idea of a “Latvian Latvia,” combined with “anti-colonization” rheto-
ric, was common to virtually all Latvian parties’ (2007, p. 54). The trend changed in the late
1990s, when ‘nativism became less pronounced and, in both countries, the main party dis-
courses and policies slowly but steadily accepted a multicultural state’ (Kelley, 2004). The
developments provided the opportunity for a consolidating and again assertive far right –
in both countries – to present itself as the only patriotic forces standing against the elites’
betrayal of the ethno-national soul of the state.
In both contexts, following a phase of consolidation and evolutionary development,
nativist parties tried to reduce their parochialism by either increasing their degree of
political acceptability among the mainstream parties or by progressively infiltrating
them and by – accordingly – transforming the very polarity and dynamics of party poli-
tics and competition in the domestic environment as it occurred in the case of Latvia.
In this latter case, the limited existing literature often refers the above-mentioned
trends as a clear instance of entryism. From this perspective, entryism (Webber,
2009) can be defined a strategy of ‘joining a rival organizational field in order to
disrupt its operations, sow discontent, manipulate decision-making, and introduce
and normalise alternative ideologies’ (Dudai, 2017). The term is often associated with
a Trotskyist tactic of ‘infiltrating larger and more moderate political parties without
commitment to their ideology and values in order to change them from within’
(Callaghan, 1986, p. 380).
3. EKRE and NA: ideological pillars, trajectories of evolution and main
areas of concern4
On 28 August 2013, EKRE, NA and their Lithuanian partners (Nationalists Union-Tautininkų
Sajunga) signed the Bauska Declaration in the homonymous town of southern Latvia.5 This
document sets up the main frame of cooperation among the three parties and, more sig-
nificantly, consolidates their ideological pillars and shared political values inside the
context of a ‘Baltic populist and radical right-wing international’.
In the preamble, the three partners bemoan the detrimental impact of ‘the looming
ideas of cultural Marxism, postmodern multiculturalism and destructive liberalism’
across Europe and add that ‘our honour and love for our homelands will not let us walk
the path of cosmopolitanism’. Further along the text, the three signatories advocate for
‘a new national awakening’ and pledge to convey and spread ‘the positive meaning of
nationalism’ through ‘national education and creative culture’. The crucial requirement
to repair the damage and reverse the trauma inflicted on the Baltic nations during the
Soviet era forms another major component in the Bauska Declaration. In particular, the
document demands ‘compensations for the occupation by the Soviet Communist
regime and acknowledgement of the occupation (by Russia)’. This is coupled with refer-
ences to the necessity to prevent ‘any violation of our sovereignty and any external intru-
sions to our domestic affairs’. In regards to immigration, the Bauska Declaration
summarizes the signatories’ main standpoints in a succinct, yet comprehensive, manner
as follows: ‘We see the immigration policies of Western Europe as a warning example.
The demographic situation in our countries does not allow any new massive immigration
into our lands’.
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EKRE was established in 2012 as the evolution of the merger between the, formerly
centre-right, People’s Union of Estonia6 (Eestimaa Rahvaliit) and the, more nationalistic
and Eurosceptic, pressure-group Estonian Patriotic Movement (Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine).
In 2011, the remainder of the People’s Union commenced talks with the Estonian Patriotic
Movement which also comprised EKRE’s vice-chairman, Martin Helme. By that time, Mart
Helme’s (EKRE’s current leader) nationalist faction had taken over the People’s Union. In
EKRE’s founding declaration, proclaimed in the central Estonian town of Põltsamaa (24
March 2012), the leadership of the new party vowed to protect the national interest, pre-
serve Estonian traditions and
… offer a viable alternative to the voters who are sick of the forced choice between Andrus
Ansip (the then leader of the centre-right liberal Reform Party) and Edgar Savisaar (former
leader of the, nominally centrist/centre-left, Centre Party), East and West, left and right.7
The party delivered a satisfactory performance in the 2015 elections garnering 8.1 per cent
of the vote and 7 seats (Table 1).
NA also came into existence as result of the merger between the national conservative
‘For Fatherland and Freedom’ – TB/LNNK8 and the more nationalistic ‘All for Latvia!-VL’
party in 2011. TB/LNNK had been engaging in strong identitarian rhetoric to mark the
primacy of the Latvian language, called for limiting the naturalization process of stateless
persons (mainly ethnic Russians) and staunchly opposed European federalism during
Latvia’s accession to the EU. According to Auers and Kasekamp (2013, p. 75), ‘All for
Latvia!’ ‘ticks all the necessary boxes for a modern radical right populist party. It has fol-
lowed the rhetorical master frame of the radical right and has a charismatic leader in
Raivis Dzintars, the founder and driving force behind VL!’.
In spite of their similar formation trajectories, a qualitative difference between the pol-
itical origins of EKRE and NA becomes noticeable. Despite the non-negligible contribution
of the Estonian Patriotic Movement, EKRE embedded itself into the pre-existing structure
of the People’s Union and inherited this party’s predominantly rural electorate along the
western coastline and in southern Estonia.9 Although keen on mobilizing its popular bases
of support (e.g. the anti-refugee demonstrations throughout 2016) and coordinating
various public manifestations (e.g. the torchlight parades on Estonia’s Independence
Day), EKRE cannot boast a longstanding tradition of grass-roots activism.
By contrast, there is ample evidence that both of NA’s constituent parties have a longer
tradition of activism and a more explicit preference for radical patterns of engagement
into politics in comparison to their Estonian counterparts. When TB/LNNK and ‘All for
Latvia!’ merged into the NA in 2011, this combination reinvigorated Latvian nationalism.
Table 1. Estonian parliamentary elections (March 2015).
Political parties Percentages (%) and seats
Reform Party 27.7 (30 seats)
Centre Party 24.8 (27 seats)
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union-IRL 13.7 (14 seats)
Social Democrats-SDE 15.2 (15 seats)
Green Party 0.9 (0 seats)
EKRE 8.1 (7 seats)
Free Party 8.7 (8 seats)
Others 0.9 (0 seats)
Source: Estonian Electoral Committee, 2015.
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Younger activists from ‘All for Latvia!’ gained influence over much of the existing TB/LNNK
party apparatus and progressively hegemonized it, particularly on the grass-roots level. ‘All
for Latvia!’ provided fresh and young political energies, very motivated activists, and ‘a
charismatic leadership in the Weberian sense of a close bond between leaders and fol-
lowers’ (Auers & Kasekamp, 2013).
Coming back to EKRE, Euroscepticism forms an important component of the party’s
engagement into politics and comprises three dimensions: geopolitical, sociocultural,
and economic. EKRE holds that the core states within the EU allegedly underestimate
the security threat which Russia poses for the Baltic States (‘Eurovalimiste Platvorm’,
2014). It equally objects to the EU’s guidelines for LGBT rights and to Estonia’s Cohabitation
Act (2016).10 As far as the party’s economic grievances are concerned, these largely revolve
around the EU’s pressures on Estonia to participate in the bailout packages for richer
member-states with troubled economies within the Eurozone. EKRE deplores the way
that ‘Estonia has been partially transformed into an area representing the interests of
the EU, foreign capital and career advocacy functionaries’ (‘Konservatiivne Manifest’,
2012), demands the taxation of tax-free foreign capital (‘Riigikogu’, 2015b) and objects
to the acquisition of land by foreign nationals. Despite the attempt to interlink the
economy with national survival, the economic component in EKRE’s narrative is subsidiary
and only of secondary importance in comparison to demographic issues and ‘older’ (the
historical legacies from the Soviet era) as well as ‘newer’ (the refugee question) aspects
of identity politics.
Various shades of geopolitical, economic and sociocultural Euroscepticism have been
characteristic of NA as well. The party has been investing its hopes on the so-called Inter-
marium project as the ‘remaining heartland of the “true Europe”’.11 This would ideally link
the far right from the Baltic to the Black Sea and function as a bulwark not only against
Putin’s ‘neo-Bolshevism’ encroaching from Moscow, but also against the neoliberal, multi-
cultural, secular and feminist ‘neo-Bolshevism’ emanating from Brussels.12 Prior to the con-
cretization of the Intermarium, TN/LNNK and ‘All for Latvia!’ had been underlining the
cultural exceptionalism of Latvia and traditional Latvian ‘Christian’ values (claiming that
homosexual values are intrinsically alien to Latvia13), while blaming high inflation and
other economic woes on Brussels. As put by Agris Purviņš – a Latvian theorist of Intermar-
ium –
the decline of moral values was provoked by Marxists who later turned into liberals incapable
of living with the thousand-years-old traditional values created by their ancestors and con-
stantly making the new utopias. At the same time, the imperialistic tendencies are already
restored in Russia, and there is a desire to enslave our nations in order to ensure the buffer
zone against the mysterious Western invasion. […] Nowadays, the security and the future
of our nations depend on our ability to unite the Intermarium countries.14
Overall, the fundamental principles and main areas of political concern for both EKRE and
NA are largely in accordance and highly resonate with the ideological pillars established in
the Bauska Declaration. Both parties seem to place an overwhelming stress on identity
politics, as well as the overriding necessity for national survival, with subsidiary references
to economic nationalism. The principle of national survival largely manifests through the
constant and powerful emphasis on demographic issues as well as the provision of exten-
sive parental benefits and other incentives to increase the birth rates in both countries (e.g.
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EKRE, Konservatiivne Programm (2015a), ‘Perekond’ section; NA, Programma (2017),
‘Atbalsts ģimenēm’ section). Furthermore, the persistence of sociocultural Euroscepticism
forms a common denominator in the political agendas and engagement of both EKRE and
NA. The two parties tend to perceive the EU as a supranational entity, governed by the
guiding principle of postmodern multiculturalism, which often endeavours to import
‘alien’ cultural norms into the two societies. In addition, neither EKRE nor NA seem to
be convinced that membership of the EU can decisively enhance Latvia’s and Estonia’s
security status vis-à-vis Russia.15 In Raivis Zeltīts’ words, ‘NA primarily views Latvia’s mem-
bership of the EU as a geopolitical and security-related issue…we do not subscribe to Mr
Juncker’s concept of Euro-federalism because it is seriously flawed’.16
Despite the commonalities in their formation trajectories and their ideological pillars,
there also exist certain differences between EKRE and NA; starting from the latter’s
longer lineage of political activism. Furthermore, as demonstrated in greater detail later
in the text, EKRE largely matches the universal typology of a European populist right-
wing party within the specific context of Estonia: Euroscepticism and nativism17; anti-
establishment rhetoric; and a stress on the hard borders principle and law and order.
The party-leadership has fashioned EKRE as a ‘modern’ party that can address and capita-
lize on a wide array of timely themes such as: (a) instances of inconsistency and political
corruption on the behalf of mainstream parties; (b) any possible manifestations of latent
Euroscepticism within the society; (c) environmental concerns (e.g. opposition to the
Rail Baltic project). By contrast, in the case of NA, the ‘essentially’ populist features, such
as anti-establishment speech, appear to be weaker whereas a more emphatic stress is
put on nativism and the necessity to increase Latvia’s birth-rate.
Nevertheless, the essential qualitative difference between the two parties revolves
around their accessibility to the government structures. Since the (early) parliamentary
elections of 2011, NA has been participating in two government coalitions and this
testifies to the party’s inclusion by its political partners. By contrast, EKRE largely
remains an outcast party. This divergence has been of decisive significance towards
shaping the two parties’ agendas and their respective patterns of engagement into poli-
tics. The following section sets in context those catalysts which have provided the oppor-
tunity structure for NA’s inclusion into the halls of power, on the one hand, and preserved
EKRE’s exclusion on the other.
4. The Latvian and Estonian party-systems: NA’s inclusion versus EKRE’s
exclusion
Before proceeding to the discussion of the two parties, it is essential to outline some
crucial structural differences, as well as commonalities, between the Estonian and the
Latvian party-systems. Although the emergence of cleavages is not a rare occurrence,
Estonia has succeeded in consolidating and institutionalizing its party-system to a much
greater extent in comparison to other post-Communist polities (Meleshevich, 2007;
Saarts, 2011). By contrast, Latvia’s party-system has been subject to higher levels of
internal fragmentation and ensuing volatility (Ikstens, 2013; Saarts, 2011). One basic com-
monality between the two party-systems is the tendency of the ethnic Russian commu-
nities to rally around parties with a civic profile: Latvia’s (nominally centre-left) Harmony
and Estonia’s (nominally centrist/centre-left) Centre Party. The popularity of these two
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parties among the ethnic Russians, as well as their calls for a foreign policy of appeasement
vis-à-vis Russia, has rendered their political rivals sceptical, to varying degrees, over their
motives and reliability.18
The latter issue requires some further elaboration and contextual analysis. In post-inde-
pendence Estonia and Latvia, the state institutions have been structured in accordance to
the restorationist and ethnic democracy model (Aalto, 2003; Agarin, 2016; Mole, 2012). The
state institutions have been fashioned in such a way as to mirror the ‘ethnic state of the
Estonians/Latvians,’ finally restored after its suppression by the Soviets, with an overriding
emphasis on the primacy of the Estonian/Latvian languages in the state bureaucracy and
the public administration (Budryte, 2005).
Nevertheless, the long-term evolution and implementation of the ethnic democracy
model has varied considerably in the two countries. Since the Bronze Soldier troubles in
2007 (Ehala, 2009), the Estonian state has been providing more room for the use of the
Russian language in the public administration (e.g. the police and tax authorities) and
the state media (e.g. the ETV+ channel) whereas the naturalization process of ‘stateless’
ethnic Russians has drastically accelerated.19 By contrast, in Latvia, the state authorities
insist on a stricter implementation of the ethnic democracy model. Consequently,
Latvian is the only official language in the public administration, even in those parts of
the country with a predominantly Russian-speaking population (e.g. the southeast
region of Latgale), whereas 237,719 Russian-speakers remain ‘stateless’ (July 2017 figure).20
These structural realities and the different evolution of the ethnic democracy model
reflect themselves upon the party-systems of Latvia and Estonia. Starting with the
former, the major concern of the mainstream centre-right and conservative parties (i.e.
Reform, Unity, and the Farmers and Greens Union), following the outcome of the 2010,
2011, and 2014 elections, was to prevent Harmony from forming a government. Therefore,
a cordon sanitaire was built around Harmony on the basis of the party’s allegedly pro-
Kremlin leanings and ensuing unreliability. It might not be an exaggeration to contend
that, despite this party’s considerable electoral weight,21 Harmony has been essentially
viewed as the outcast party by the Latvian mainstream parties. This was the major catalyst
which encouraged these parties to accept NA as a legitimate partner in two government
coalitions (2011 and 2014) especially after the latter consolidated its status in the 2014
elections garnering 16.61 per cent of the vote (Table 2).
Table 2. Latvian parliamentary elections (October 2014).
Political parties Percentages (%) and seats
Harmony 23.00 (24 seats)
Unity 21.87 (23 seats)
Union of Greens and Farmers 19.53 (21 seats)
National Alliance 16.61 (17 seats)
For Latvia from the Heart 6.85 (7 seats)
Latvian Association of Regions 6.66 (6 seats)
Latvian Russian Union 1.58 (0 seats)
United for Latvia 1.18 (0 seats)
Latvian Development 0.89 (0 seats)
New Conservative Party 0.70 (0 seats)
Freedom: Free from Fear, Hate and Anger 0.19 (0 seats)
Growth 0.17 (0 seats)
Sovereignty 0.11 (0 seats)
Source: Latvian Electoral Committee, 2014.
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NA’s successful entryism into two consecutive governments impacted on the party’s
pattern of policy-making in two noteworthy ways. On the one hand, NA has been
granted the opportunity to promote its agenda on demographic issues and lobby for
the introduction of favourable measures for large families and the subsequent provision
of stimuli towards the increase of the birth rate.22 On the other hand, although not aban-
doning their criticism of the EU, NA affiliates now officially contend that they are not a
Eurosceptic party but, instead, they ‘ … negotiate the return of the EU to its “original”
values through the revision of the Euro-federalism doctrine and the immigration pol-
icies’.23 To these should be added that NA’s anti-establishment rhetoric has also
become milder, despite its two constituent parties’ long trajectories of political activism.
The situation in Estonia is distinctly different. The implementation of a softer variant of
the ethnic democracy model has recently coincided with a greater stress on socioeco-
nomic issues (namely social welfare), the revision of the neoliberal consensus over the
management of the economy and the relative swing of Estonian politics towards the
left. November 2016 saw the dissolution of the previous government coalition which con-
sisted of the (neoliberal-orientated) Reform Party, the conservative Pro Patria and Res
Publica Union-IRL and the Social Democrats-SDE.24 The steering wheel behind this devel-
opment was the disagreements between the Reform Party and the SDE over the increase
of taxation and the extension of welfare provisions that was proposed by the latter. Their
shared pro-welfare disposition seems to have provided the essential common ground
between the Centre Party and the SDE.25 This paved the way to the inclusion of the
Centre Party as the largest partner (Table 1) in the government coalition that was
formed in November 2016, together with the SDE and the Pro Patria and Res Publica
Union-IRL.26
By contrast to NA, though, the Estonian party system did not enable EKRE to make it
into the halls of power, even following the dissolution of the previous government
coalition. In particular, there seems to be an explicit cleavage between SDE and EKRE in
most areas of policymaking. The cleavage between the two parties intensified after the
last presidential elections (2016) and Martin Helme’s firm opposition to the candidacy
of Marina Kaljurand (Former Minister of Foreign Affairs) on the basis of her partly
Russian and partly Latvian family background.27 In addition, EKRE’s platform does not
seem to essentially challenge the neoliberal consensus on social welfare.28 As an aggre-
gate of these political circumstances, whereas in Latvia the cordon sanitaire was formed
around Harmony, in Estonia, the cordon sanitaire has been moulded – so far – around
EKRE. In spite of its ongoing exclusion from the halls of power, EKRE’s public appeal is
on the rise and it stood as Estonia’s third most popular party throughout 2017 and the
first half of 2018 (Tables 3–6, Diagram 1).
By contrast to NA and its recently-adopted milder tones, EKRE’s persistent exclusion has
maintained the Euroscepticism and the anti-establishment rhetoric of the party intact.
EKRE contends that the current state of political affairs in Estonia ‘favours the interests
of specific segments within the society in a one-sided manner’ and that it is characterized
by an ‘excessive, often undemocratic, centralization of power with no independent vision
of development’ (‘Konservatiivne Manifest’, 2012). In accordance to EKRE’s leadership,
institutions such as the media also form part of the establishment. In Martin Helme’s
words, ‘Estonian state media are always loyal to the government and this provides
them with an additional incentive to depict EKRE in a negative light… the accusations
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Table 3. Popularity ratings of political parties in Estonia
(June 2018).
Political parties Rate of popularity (%)
Reform Party 28
Centre Party 27
EKRE 18
Social Democrats-SDE 9
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union-IRL 5
Green Party 4
Free Party 2
Source: Turu-uuringute AS, (May 29th–June 11th, 2018; 1,000
respondents).
Table 4. Popularity ratings of political parties in
Estonia (January 2018).
Political parties Rate of popularity (%)
Reform Party 34.5
Centre Party 20.5
EKRE 18.4
Social Democrats-SDE 11.0
Free Party 5.4
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union-IRL 4.5
Green Party 4.5
Source: Kantar Emor, (January 18th–25th, 2018; 1,107
respondents).
Table 5. Popularity ratings of political parties in Estonia
(August 2017).
Political parties Rate of popularity (%)
Centre Party 29.0
Reform Party 24.0
EKRE 12.0
Social Democrats-SDE 12.0
Free Party 6.0
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union-IRL 5.0
Green Party 4.0
Source: Turu-uuringute AS, (August 9th–22nd, 2017; 1,006
respondents).
Table 6. Popularity ratings of political parties in Estonia
(June 2017).
Political parties Rate of popularity (%)
Reform Party 25.4
Centre Party 25.1
EKRE 16.2
Social Democrats-SDE 14.2
Free Party 8.5
Pro Patria and Res Publica Union-IRL 6.6
Green Party 3.5
Source: Kantar Emor, (June 9th–16th, 2017; 1,125 respondents).
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of “racism” that they often levy against us mean little to the Estonian people.’29 Certain
specificities of the political landscape have, if only by default, facilitated the party’s cam-
paign. Despite the more tangible impact of the politics of consensus, in comparison to
other post-Communist polities, Estonian politics have been revolving around a party
system which is subject to fluidity and shifting loyalties.
Parties with conflicting standpoints (e.g. the SDE and the Reform Party on the welfare
state) have often watered down their disagreements in order to form coalition govern-
ments. The crisis and dissolution of the previous government coalition is indicative of
these situational alignments and the absence of long-term consensus. To this one
should add that, throughout the last decade, high-profile politicians have faced charges
of corruption (e.g. Edgar Savisaar during his tenure as Tallinn mayor).30 It is this intersec-
tion between malleability in policymaking and the perceptions of political corruption
within the society which has enabled EKRE to build its image as ‘the only true anti-estab-
lishment party in Estonia’.31
5. EKRE, NA and (anti-)immigration: situating the present inside the
context of the past
The refugee quotas debate has generated controversies and engendered a ‘centre versus
periphery’ cleavage within the EU: Germany versus the Visegrad Four (also Italy, the UK,
etc.). Further to the northeast, the refugee crisis has, since 2015, remarkably affected
the political debate and the partisan narratives in both Latvia and Estonia.
In line with the idea of preserving national sovereignty on immigration-related matters,
PM Laimdota Straujuma publicly stated that Latvia was against fixed quotas for accepting
refugees, calling rather for voluntary measures (May 2015).32 However, the government
was also very aware of the risks of isolation vis-à-vis the EU partners if zero-sum, Vise-
grad-style, opposition to the relocation system was adopted as the official position. There-
fore, the government preferred to engage in negotiations with Brussels, rather than opting
for more hard-line alternatives. This put NA in the uncomfortable position of balancing
opposition to the quotas and permanence in the governmental coalition. This issue
became more complicated as the number of refugees allocated to Latvia grew from the
initially proposed 40–50 units to 766.33
In accordance to the EU’s quota arrangement, Estonia agreed to host 550 relocated
persons (September 2016).34 By March 2018, 206 of them were stationed in the country
(Ministry of Interior) and a refugee assistance centre has been functioning in the locality
Diagram 1. *EKRE’s growth of popularity (2015–2018). *The pre-2012 data refers to the People’s Union
of Estonia. Source: Erakonnad Monitoring Agency, 2018.
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of Vao (Lääne-Viru county). Estonia has not been as vocal as their Central European EU-
partners. Still, in former PM Taavi Rõivas’ (Reform Party) words, ‘the EC had made an
error in its calculation and even if Estonia did welcome the refugees, the quota should
be much lower’.35 Even the SDE, otherwise highly sensitive to humanitarian issues,
voiced certain reservations over the Commission’s directive whereas the Centre Party
issued a (rejected) petition for a referendum over the maximum number of refugees
that Estonia can accept (September 2016).
The respective engagements of EKRE and NA over the refugee debate have been highly
conditional upon the earlier discussed dichotomy between exclusion and inclusion. Start-
ing with the former, as early as July 2015, Martin Helme dubbed the majority of asylum
seekers ‘illegitimate refugees who are looking for social welfare’ adding that ‘if we came
to power, EKRE would deport them’.36 A few months later, on 6 February 2016, EKRE inten-
sified and internationalized its engagement via staging countrywide protests against ‘the
Islamization of Europe’ as part of a pan-European network (comprising Germany’s Pegida
and other grass-roots initiatives).37 Particular attention was paid to the wave of sexual
assaults in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2016 and the ensuing ‘necessity to protect Estonian
and European women’. These incidents were interpreted as ‘the shape of things to come’
for the entire Continent, if Germany and Brussels insist on an ‘open borders’ approach to
Muslim immigration (Petsinis, 2016).
EKRE’s exclusion has enabled the party to swiftly anchor its vocal campaign against the
refugee quotas within the frame of its Euroscepticism and anti-establishment discourse in
domestic politics (Braghiroli & Makarychev, 2017). On the one hand, EKRE held the EU
accountable for imposing its directives on Estonia in such a manner that it disregards
and contravenes the will of the majority.38 On the other hand, the government was
accused of ignoring the will of the people and ‘lying to the public’.39 The public survey
conducted by the Turu-Uuringute AS agency in March 2016 detected a clear link
between EKRE’s capitalization on anti-refugee rhetoric (especially after the Brussels terror-
ist attacks on 22 March 2016) and the party’s increase of popularity.40 These observations
correspond to the findings of the Erakonnad monitoring service (hosted by the TNS Emor
AS agency) which equally hint at the correlation among EKRE’s increasing public appeal,
the intensification of the refugee quotas debate and terrorist incidents across Europe
during the first half of 2016 (Cologne and Brussels, in particular) (Diagram 1).41
In Latvia, even the virtual debate over the refugee quotas triggered a string of protests,
organized by grass-roots groupings such as the Guardians of the Fatherland, throughout
2015 and 2016.42 By contrast to EKRE’s dynamic engagement and mobilization, though,
NA’s operation from within the halls of power called for a more gradualist strategy. At a
first instance, this consisted in an attempt to align with and take advantage of the wide-
spread reservations over the fixed quotas arrangement, as well as the shared preference
for ‘case-specific’ solutions in accordance to the specificities of each member-state, among
the majority of parties in the parliament (Harmony included).
Consequently, in May 2015, the NA faction leader in the government, Imants Parā-
dnieks, stated that: ‘there are no international obligations requiring Latvia to accept any
refugee quotas. Latvia has the right to determine its own migration policy rather than
thoughtlessly follow the ideological framework set by the EC for resolving this refugee
issue’.43 At a second instance, the NA-affiliates started to interlink the refugee debate
with state security and national survival more concretely and emphatically. Therefore,
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the party leadership started urging the government to ‘act responsibly regarding this sen-
sitive national security issue and in talks with foreign partners to express this position,
which has the support of the majority in Latvian society’.44 In a similar spirit to the
Bauska Declaration and its take on the ‘failed’ Western immigration policies, Janis Iesal-
nieks, a senior official at the Justice Ministry and prominent member of NA, hinted at
the toll that the refugee quotas can claim on Latvia’s demographic realities by bringing
up the Swedish precedent: ‘Is this what we want in Latvia? 127,000 immigrants arrived
in Sweden in 2014 but meanwhile 115,000 children were born (including immigrant
families)’.45
In spite of the dichotomy between exclusion and inclusion, though, both EKRE and NA
converged in their endeavour to interlink the post-war planned migration project under
the Soviets with the new realities of the refugee issue. From a theoretical angle, locating
the past in the context of the present is a common technique among nationalist actors
which helps interpret developments along a linear trajectory and satisfy the quest for
meaning among their bases of support (Connor, 1993; Smith, 2000, pp. 82–83). Further-
more, the origins of anti-immigrant sentiments may vary considerably from one society
to the other and political parties or groupings that put a high stress on the hard
borders principle tend to anchor their narratives primarily into symbols and imageries
derived from their own societies’ historical experience.
In this light, NA’s lawmaker, Janis Dombrava, resorted to the ethno-cultural argument
and hinted at the massive inflow of non-autochthonous population after the Second
World War stating that Latvia already had the highest level of ‘other ethnicities’ in the
EU, therefore, further immigration is ‘not possible’.46 NA embeds opposition to the
refugee quotas into its rejection of Euro-federalism and, if only subtly, has been seeking
to draw parallels between the EU’s management of the refugee crisis and the state-spon-
sored migration under the Soviets. In Edvins Šnore’s words, ‘Mr. Juncker obviously wants to
reduce the sovereignty of nations’ adding that ‘the EC’s approach is very naïve: Bring the
refugees to states like Latvia (or Estonia) and the problem will be miraculously solved! The
bulk of the refugees that we accepted preferred to move to Scandinavia and/or
Germany’.47
In a similar vein, EKRE’s campaign against the admission of refugees possesses an idio-
syncratic socio-psychological dimension. It capitalizes on the collective memories of ‘colo-
nization’ under the Soviets (Hallik, 2002, p. 71; Kreindler, 1988, p. 11 and 13; Peiker, 2016,
pp. 120–123) and the collective fears of becoming ‘colonized’ again by others in the future.
Apart from the influx of war refugees from the Middle East, the party remains equally con-
cerned over the ‘(East) Slavic immigration to Estonia’ (‘Eurovalimiste Platvorm’, 2014)
because this may allegedly result in ‘a new colonization and the demographic prevalence
of Russophones over Estonians in the next 30 years’.48 Under this light, it is no coincidence
that allusions to the Soviet era and the Russification campaign interweave in EKRE’s rheto-
ric with references to the threat that immigration allegedly poses to national survival. As
the former Estonian President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, subtly hinted, public reservations
over the refugee question and immigration should not be disconnected from the ‘coloni-
zation’ under the Soviets and its long-term ramifications on the society.49
In addition to situating the present inside the context of the past, the socio-psychologi-
cal strategy of the two parties also embodies a preemptive dimension which is centred on
the future. In Martin Helme’s words, ‘Global terrorism poses a security threat for Estonia
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but this is lower in comparison to Western Europe. However, the refugee quota arrange-
ment, dictated by the EU, can generate potential perils in the immediate future’.50 NA’s
leadership equally tends to draw a tentative correlation between the (increased) physical
presence of Muslim communities and the future prospects for the import of terrorism and/
or other asymmetric threats. In Edvins Šnore’s words, ‘Latvia is mostly safe from global (lit-
erally Islamic) terrorism because we only have a tiny Muslim community. The larger the
Muslim minority, the greater the security risk can be (e.g. France, Belgium, or
Germany)’.51 This viewpoint is seconded by Raivis Zeltīts who judges that
the real threat is connected with the existence of a Muslim minority within the state. If you
look at the UK or France, ghettoization, crime and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism con-
stitute an explosive blend. Latvia is and will remain safe if it manages to escape the migration
waves.52
Therefore, identity-politics and their selective appropriation seem to have gained pre-
cedence over the minuscule presence of war refugees in Latvia and Estonia and
evolved into a key component in EKRE’s and NA’s campaigns. This development is
largely in accordance with the intersection among Euroscepticism, anti-immigration and
the allusions to the collective trauma inherited from the Soviet era in the text of the
Bauska Declaration. At a first instance, NA’s entryism dictated a more gradualist strategy
on the party’s behalf over the refugee question. In the longer term, though, this entryism
seems to have enabled the party to promote its standpoints more effectively and from
within the government structures.
Meanwhile, EKRE’s persistent exclusion appears to provide plenty of room for this
party’s more dynamic engagement with the objective to capitalize on the public grie-
vances vis-à-vis the Estonian establishment and the EU over the management of the
refugee crisis. Setting the inclusion versus exclusion dichotomy aside, there is an
additional common denominator which facilitates the political engagement of both
parties over the refugee issue. This is, namely, the shared reservations of most Estonian
and Latvian parties over the fixed quotas and their preferences for case-specific arrange-
ments on the basis of each member-state’s particularities and specificities.
6. Conclusions
The objective of this piece was to comparatively investigate the developmental trends of
the two main populist and radical right-wing parties in Latvia and Estonia, by looking at
the exogenous impact of each country’s party system and at the related endogenous
dimensions of identity politics on the parties’ capacity to establish themselves as accepta-
ble governmental partners and avoid marginalization. The context of the ongoing refugee
crisis and the ensuing virtual debate was examined as a trigger to explore the reactions of
these political forces to the new realities, rather per se.
The comparative analysis of the narratives and strategies of the two parties high-
lighted evident similarities in terms of ideological platforms and programmatic priori-
ties. Both parties emerged as anti-establishment and nativist forces, with a powerful
emphasis on the ethno-national definition of their respective policies (Connor, 1993),
thereby stressing aspects related to the protection of the status of the national
languages from the heritage of the Soviet past and their role as the only genuine
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representatives of the deep essence of the nation, betrayed by its corrupt and distant
elites. EKRE and NA also proved champions of Euroscepticism and in the opposition to
postmodern values such as LGBT rights or multiculturalism, as highlighted in the Bauska
Declaration.
The analysis highlighted certain endogenous differences in the developmental trends
of the two forces that seemingly have played a significant role in their chances to be con-
sidered legitimate coalition partners by more mainstream forces. Our study shows that if
compared to Estonia’s EKRE, NA can boast a longer tradition of political activism and, fol-
lowing the merger between TB-LNNK and ‘All for Latvia,’ the party managed to combine
the structures of the former with the fresh energies of the latter. At the same time, the
party slowly, but steadily, watered down its anti-establishment rhetoric and progressively
down-toned its degree of Euroscepticism in order to adapt to this new centrality in the
Latvian party system.
In the light of both endogenous and exogenous factors, in Latvia, NA has succeeded in
consolidating its status and successfully established itself as one of the countries’ key
forces. Accordingly, its acceptance by the other partners is witnessed by its participation
in every government of Latvia since the 2011 parliamentary elections, as part of the joint
endeavour to prevent Harmony (i.e. the essentially outcast party in this context) from
entering the government structures. It might not be an exaggeration to contend that
NA’s strategy represents an exceptional example of successful entryism.
In Estonia, on the contrary, EKRE – despite the steady increase of its public appeal – has
been excluded from any prospects to enter a government coalition precisely due to the
successful inclusion of the Centre Party. In 2016, the Centre Party – under its new leader-
ship – successfully formed a government with SDE and IRL. At the same time, EKRE’s
pattern of interaction with the mainstream parties appears rather volatile and complicated
(if compared to NA in the Latvian case), therefore, EKRE currently fits the profile of an
outcast party to a considerable degree. In both cases, a combination of endogenous
and exogenous factors seems to condition the position of these parties in the respective
party systems.
The analysis of the developmental trends in the cases of EKRE and NA seems to high-
light how the exclusion of the former and the inclusion of the latter are due to both
endogenous factors related to the particularities of each context’s identity politics and
exogenous differences in the two-party systems when dealing with parties suspected of
pro-Kremlin leanings – respectively, Estonia’s Centre Party and Latvia’s Harmony.
When it comes to the specificities of each context’s identity politics, particularly telling
appears the analysis of the parties’ strategies when it comes to the ongoing refugee crisis,
which – in the context of the Baltics – assumes the features of a virtual debate, given the
very limited number of refugees accepted and the low attractiveness of the two countries
in the eyes of many migrants. Despite its virtual nature, both in Latvia and Estonia, the
debate – often representing a shortcut to address issues such as multiculturalism, post-
modernism, terrorism, and national identity – has very vividly affected the political
dynamics and partisan stances, since 2015.
In the Estonian case, EKRE’s anti-immigration stances have taken a strong anti-establish-
ment turn, the main objectives of which appeared to be the mainstream parties, guilty of
having ‘sold Estonia to Brussels’, thereby reflecting the party’s outcast status and counter-
hegemonic position in the Estonian party system. In the Latvian case, NA has elaborately
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combined populist slogans against Brussels and the transnational elites, as well as a
powerful anti-refugee rhetoric, with a pragmatic behaviour vis-à-vis the coalition partners
in order to retain its key role in the government. At the same time, NA has managed to
exert a non-negligible impact (towards a conservative direction) on nearly every govern-
mental decision which pertains to immigration, asylum, and – broadly defined,
multiculturalism.
Notes
1. The present article was finalized before the Latvian parliamentary elections of October 2018.
2. The MSSD applies both to the parties analyzed and to the domestic, in Mudde’s words, ethno-
cratic contexts – Estonia and Latvia – in which they operate.
3. In 1991, the Lithuanian state automatically granted universal citizenship to all residents. By
contrast, the main bulk of post-war settlers in Estonia and Latvia, mostly ethnic Russians,
were rendered ‘stateless’ and had to start a complex process of naturalization – including
also strict language requirements – in order to obtain the citizenship of the newly-indepen-
dent republics.
4. It should be noted that, apart from NA, Latvia’s party landscape also comprises other right-
wing parties with a nationalist orientation (e.g. ‘For Latvia from the Heart’/NSL). However,
the focus of this piece is cast on NA, on the basis of this party’s greater electoral weight, con-
tinuous participation in the government structures and established partnership with EKRE.
5. EKRE (2013). ‘Bauska Deklaratsioon’. (https://ekre.ee/bauska-deklaratsioon/). A full text-version
in English can be accessed on: http://tautininkas.blogspot.com.ee/.
6. The People’s Union was a partner in the large electoral coalition (the Estonian Coalition Union)
during the second legislature (1995–1999) and then again between 2003 and 2007.
7. http://www.delfi.ee/archive/print.php?id=64124549.
8. It should be noted that this party had been in almost every government since 1995: first as TB
and LNNK separately, then also after their merge into TB/LNNK.
9. In the 2015 elections, EKRE was the third strongest party in the western district of Pärnumaa.
On this issue, see: http://rk2015.vvk.ee/voting-results-12.html.
10. In its programme, EKRE vows to uphold ‘Christian family values and the traditional family
model which consists of a father, mother, and children’ (‘Perekond’ section).
11. http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/video/raivis-zeltits-intermarium-un-eiropas-nakotne/.
12. http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/2367-a-far-right-hijack-of-interm
arium.
13. https://www.ilga-europe.org/sites/default/files/Attachments/latvia_-_homophobic_speech_
in_latvia_english.pdf.
14. http://reconquista-europe.tumblr.com/post/156974224221/agris-purvi%C5%86%C5%A1-inte
rmarium-as-a-civilizational.
15. Interviews with the Secretary-general of the Latvian National Alliance and a National Alliance
representative at the Latvian Saeima (assembly) and the European parliament (13/10/2017);
Interview with the Vice Chairman of EKRE (12/10/2016).
16. Interview with the Secretary-general of the Latvian National Alliance (13/10/2017).
17. As understood within the frame of this piece, the concept of nativism holds that primacy must
be given to the political rights, the economic needs and the cultural identity of the ethnic/
native members of the titular nations. For a more thorough discussion of nativism and how
it differentiates from populism, see Pappas (2018).
18. A remarkably controversial watershed for the two parties was their decision to sign memor-
andums of cooperation with Vladimir Putin’s United Russia (Centre Party: 2004; Harmony:
2009). Both agreements focused on cooperation and exchange of information over the
economy and other policy-areas but were never actually implemented since then. However,
this sufficed for rival parties in both countries to capitalize on these two agreements as
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major indicators of unreliability on the part of Harmony and the Centre Party. In the Latvian
case, this mood of apprehension has been persisting even after Harmony cancelled its mem-
orandum of cooperation (October 2017). On Estonia, see: http://news.err.ee/119629/overview-
center-party-s-cooperation-protocol-with-putin-s-united-russia. On Latvia, see: https://news.
err.ee/635146/latvia-s-saskana-party-ditches-agreement-with-putin-s-united-russia.
19. On 21 January 2015, the parliament introduced a new set of amendments to the Law on Citi-
zenship. A stateless child born in Estonia to parents with ‘undetermined citizenship’, who have
lived in Estonia for at least 5 years before the child’s birth, is automatically eligible to obtain
citizenship. Whereas, in 2004, the percentage of stateless individuals corresponded to approxi-
mately 12.5 per cent of the total population (i.e. 172,000 persons) (Van Elsuwege, 2004), by
2017, the total number of ‘stateless persons’ had dropped to 79,300. On the latter issue,
see: http://www.statelessness.eu/blog/fight-voting-rights-stateless-persons-estonia-and-latvia.
20. http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/documents/Iedzivotaju%20re%C4%A3istrs/010717/ISVP_La
tvija_pec_VPD.pdf.
21. Harmony emerged as the strongest party in its own right, in the 2011 and the 2014 elections,
garnering 28.36 per cent and 23 per cent of the vote respectively.
22. Interview with an academic expert on populism at Latvia University (28/07/2017).
23. Interviews with the Secretary-general of the Latvian National Alliance and a National Alliance
representative at the Latvian Saeima and the European parliament (13/10/2017).
24. http://news.err.ee/v/news/952dcb2e-bb26-4c32-a87a-0a4f073fec01/government-falls-as-soci
al-democrats-and-irl-leave-coalition.
25. One complementary development which facilitated the inclusion of the Centre Party to the
new government was the departure of Edgar Savisaar from the party-leadership (2016). A
veteran politician and entrepreneur, Savisaar had been leading the Centre Party throughout
the post-Communist era. This development coincided with the emergence of a reformist
segment consisting of younger cadres (e.g. the current chairman of the Centre Party and Esto-
nian PM, Jüri Ratas).
26. It should be borne in mind that the Centre Party had participated in the coalition government
that was formed after the 1995 elections. Edgar Savisaar became Minister of Internal Affairs,
while the Centre Party became in charge of four more ministries (Social Affairs, Economy, Edu-
cation and Transportation and Communications). The Centre Party also formed part of the
coalition government between 2002 and 2003.
27. http://balticworlds.com/finally-breaking-the-deadlock/.
28. EKRE’s programme provides for an increase in the minimum wage and state-pensions that can
guarantee a decent living (‘Sotsiaalpoliitika’ section). However, the party also contends that
the people’s well-being must rely on the overall development of the economy and not
solely on social benefits (including a pledge to recall unjustified pensions and benefits) (Ibid.)
29. Interview with the vice chairman of EKRE (12/10/2016).
30. http://news.err.ee/v/politics/2b68a0b6-7636-4070-8389-f9751d5874a4/savisaar-suspended-fr
om-mayors-office.
31. Interview with a political sociologist at Tallinn University (08/06/2016). Moreover, the survey
conducted by the sociologist Juhan Kivirähk for the Turu-uuringute AS agency (March
2018) found out that the party’s anti-establishment rhetoric resonated with the low trust of
two-thirds of its voters (the lowest among all parties) to the parliament, the government
and the President. On this issue, see: https://www.err.ee/692131/kivirahk-tahtis-pole-see-
mida-sinust-raagitakse-vaid-et-uldse-raagitakse.
32. http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/legislation/?doc=106034&output=d&ins_print.
33. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/interior-minister-we-agreed-to-relocate-not-admit-53
1-refugees.a156528/.
34. http://news.err.ee/v/179f0f5d-0a10-459c-b26e-4c714e38ba7b.
35. http://news.err.ee/v/55ea4612-1abb-4cee-95ef-91e4bc775df9.
36. http://news.err.ee/v/8728b4fd-d8c5-4c5b-b89e-93a608f381f0.
37. http://news.err.ee/v/6614e41a-1fb7-4b87-a205-987d4b1a77d5.
38. Interview with the Vice-chairman of EKRE (12/10/2016).
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39. http://news.err.ee/v/f58cb255-07ed-4cac-b0f9-e6f65ca43f83.
40. In accordance to the findings of this survey, EKRE’s popularity jumped from an estimated 13
per cent to 19 per cent immediately after the Brussels bombings. On this issue, see: http://
www.postimees.ee/3637703/uuring-bruesseli-terroriruennak-tostis-ekre-toetuse-reformierako
nna-kannule.
41. http://www.erakonnad.info/reiting.html.
42. https://www.baltictimes.com/anti-refugee_rally_takes_on_latvian_government_2680716675
5c21627948b7/.
43. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/lawmakers-reluctant-to-take-in-refugees.a128591/.
44. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/latvia-to-lodge-objection-to-refugee-quotas.a129119/.
45. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/refugee-numbers-known-in-a-month-says-pm.
a135277/.
46. http://eng.lsm.lv/article/politics/politics/lawmakers-reluctant-to-take-in-refugees.a128591/.
47. Interview with a National Alliance representative at the Latvian Saeima (assembly) and the
European parliament (13/10/2017).
48. Interview with the Vice-chairman of EKRE (12/10/2016).
49. http://news.err.ee/v/55ea4612-1abb-4cee-95ef-91e4bc775df9
50. Interview with the Vice Chairman of EKRE (12/10/2016)
51. Interview with a National Alliance representative at the Latvian Saeima (assembly) and the
European parliament (13/10/2017)
52. Interview with the Secretary-general of the Latvian National Alliance (13/10/2017).
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